A recent Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision upheld an Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding where the respondent’s affidavit was “substantially similar, and in some regards identical, to an asylum application previously filed by respondent’s brother in a different proceeding.” Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015).
In this case, the first brother came to the U.S., filed for asylum, and was granted. In his asylum application, brother # 1 stated that he was arrested two times–in 2004 and 2006–and he described what happened during those arrests. Later, the second brother (respondent or R-K-K-) came to America and filed for asylum. He also claimed to have been arrested two times–in April and May 2010. R-K-K- described his arrests in terms remarkably similar to his brother’s case, including the time of day when he was arrested, the abuse endured, conversations with abusers, and psychological harm. R-K-K- even included in his affidavit the same spelling and grammar mistakes as his brother.
After informing R-K-K- of the problem, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) gave him time to gather evidence and explain himself. R-K-K- claimed that the similarities were the result of the brothers’ “common backgrounds and experience,” and because they were assisted by the same transcriber. The IJ asked R-K-K- to locate the transcriber, but R-K-K- was unable to do so.
The IJ did not accept R-K-K-‘s explanation. He found R-K-K- not credible and denied the application for asylum. R-K-K- appealed.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and issued a published decision in order to set forth a “procedural framework under which an Immigration Judge should address… inter-proceeding similarities.” The short answer here is that (1) the IJ must give the respondent notice that her case has been found substantially similar to another case; (2) allow her an opportunity to explain what happened; and (3) determine the respondent’s credibility based on the totality of the circumstances. The shorter answer is, Who cares?
I do not know how often “inter-proceeding similarities” are an issue, but I imagine it happens now and again. When I was a Judicial Law Clerk at the end of the last century, I worked on a Somali case that was essentially identical to an unrelated person’s case. The affidavits and events were word-for-word the same. Only a few names had been changed to personalize the story a bit. So I suppose there is nothing wrong with establishing a framework for analyzing the problem.
But to me, it seems that the Board in R-K-K- is missing the larger issue. Yes, it appears that R-K-K- committed a fraud, and yes, under the applicable legal standard, he should probably be deported. And fine, it’s nice to have a framework to assess credibility when this issue comes up. But what about the missing “transcriber”? Where is the person who prepared this fraudulent case? He is nowhere to be found. And the BIA does not seem to care.
Frankly, the BIA’s decision here makes me angry. Everyone in this business knows that asylum fraud is a problem. We also know that there are (hopefully) a small number of attorneys and notarios (or transcribers) who are responsible for much of this fraud. These people damage the asylum system and make life more difficult for legitimate asylum seekers.
Some–perhaps most–of the fraudsters’ clients are active participants in the fraud. But at least in my experience cleaning up their messes, many of these “clients” are naïve victims of unscrupulous attorneys who find it all too easy to manipulate frightened people who do not speak English, who are predisposed to mistrust authority (because they were harmed by the authorities in the home country), who do not understand “the system,” and who have no support network in the United States.
So is R-K-K- a victim or a villain? We don’t know, and given the BIA’s “framework” for analyzing similar cases, I guess we never will.
How could this decision have been better? It seems a crime was committed here, so why not involve law enforcement? When a possible fraud has been detected, the Board could require the IJ to inform the applicant about the possible fraud, advise him that if he cannot overcome the finding of fraud, he faces criminal and immigration penalties, and give him an opportunity to switch attorneys and/or work with law enforcement to expose and prosecute the guilty party. He should also be made aware of the benefits of cooperation. The alien can refuse to go along, of course, in which case he will face the consequences. But if he does cooperate, he should be rewarded, particularly if it turns out that he was more of a victim than a co-conspirator.
There is precedent for this type of coercion in immigration proceedings. In Matter of Lozada, the BIA basically held that if an alien has been denied relief due to the ineffective assistance of her attorney, she can reopen her case, but to do so, she generally must file a bar complaint against the ineffective attorney. This requirement forces attorneys to police their own by possibly having their colleagues disbarred. I don’t like it, but I’ll file a complaint when it’s justified. And–so the reasoning goes–if the offending attorney is barred from practice, his future clients/victims will be protected.
The problem addressed by R-K-K- is worse than the one described in Lozada. In Lozada, we are talking about ineffective assistance of counsel–this ranges from a benign screw-up (which can–and does–happen even to the best attorneys) to dereliction of duty. In R-K-K-, on the other hand, the Board is addressing outright fraud: The attorney or notario (or applicant) has appropriated someone else’s case as her own in the hope of outwitting the fact-finder. This is malicious and dangerous behavior that requires punishment. The regime created by R-K-K- allows the little fish to fry and the big fish to keep swimming. It addresses a symptom of the fraud without reaching the source. I hope that the BIA will one day revisit this issue and that it will take a stronger stance against asylum fraud.