FGM + Other Serious Harm = Asylum

I had a case last week where the Eritrean government arrested and beat my client because they believed she helped her brother escape from the national military service.  We tried to frame the case in terms of imputed political opinion (our claim was that the authorities thought my client was “anti-government” because she helped her brother escape), but it was a bit of a tough sell.  We came up with a strategy that may have saved the day (she received asylum), so I thought I would share, as this strategy could be employed by many women who face persecution that is not based on a protected ground.

The key to our strategy was that my client had been a victim of female genital mutilation (“FGM”) early in her life.  In a well known decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that FGM could form the basis for an asylum claim.  Thus, FGM may be considered past persecution based on a protected ground.

Until the recent BIA decision, these guys had done more than anyone to define "other serious harm."

Where a person has been subject to past persecution based on a protected ground, she is eligible for asylum if there is a “reasonable possibility” that she will face “other serious harm” in her country, regardless of whether that harm is based on a protected ground and regardless of whether that harm is related to the original persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).  While I had written previously about “other serious harm,” it had not occurred to me how useful this provision could be for many female asylum seekers.

FGM is prevalent in a number of African countries and elsewhere.  A woman who has been subjected to FGM has likely satisfied the first prong of the requirement for “other serious harm” asylum.   To satisfy the other requirement, the asylum seeker must demonstrate that she faces a reasonable possibility of other serious harm in her country.  This could be any type of harm and does not have to be based on a protected ground or related to the original persecution.  

Until recently, there has been little guidance about what constitutes “other serious harm,” but last month, the BIA published a decision examining this basis for asylum. See Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012).  In that case, the Board held that to qualify as “other serious harm,” the harm must be as severe as persecution, and the Board has given some examples:

Such conditions may include, but are not limited to, those involving civil strife, extreme economic deprivation beyond economic disadvantage, or situations where the claimant could experience severe mental or emotional harm or physical injury.

A number of federal circuit courts (all listed in Matter of L-S-) have given examples of what might constitute other serious harm.  The list is quite diverse: (1) harm resulting from the unavailability of necessary medical care; (2) the mental anguish of a mother who was herself a victim of FGM whose daughter faces the same fate; (3) the unavailability of needed psychiatric medications; (4) victimization by criminals or militias; (5) unavailability of necessary AIDS medications coupled with social stigma.  While diverse, this list is obviously not exhaustive, and it seems to me there is a lot of room for creative lawyering (for example, might criminal prosecution qualify if the punishment is severe enough?).

Thus, for victims of FGM, the “other serious harm” category of asylum could be a useful tool to obtain asylum, even if the harm they face is not based on a protected ground.

Must Attorneys Always Ask Their Clients About FGM?

In a strongly-worded dissenting opinion, Judge Harry Pregerson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court wrote that an immigration attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to ask her client about whether the client had been subject to female genital mutilation (“FGM”).

In Teclezghi v. Holder, Nos. 07-70661 & 07-71463 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011), Judge Pregerson writes:

An attorney representing an asylum seeker has a duty to investigate all grounds upon which an applicant may be entitled to relief… [and must] inquire as to whether her female client has suffered female genital mutilation when (1) nearly 90 percent of women in the client’s home country endure such a brutal procedure, and (2) it is well-settled that female genital mutilation constitutes persecution sufficient to warrant a grant of asylum.

The Judge concludes by rejecting the majority’s reasoning that an attorney should not be required to inquire about something as personal as FGM:

The panel majority fails to recognize that most political asylum applications are intensely personal, often painful, and may involve questions of sexual torture, rape, and humiliation. It is entirely expected that clients may not want to readily reveal such circumstances to their attorneys. It is precisely because the subject matter of an asylum claim based on female genital mutilation is so intensely personal and our immigration system so complex that an attorney has a special responsibility to adequately explain to her female clients their rights to asylum and diligently investigate all grounds for relief. The panel majority’s decision allowing attorneys to forego investigating intensely personal facts in an asylum claim diminishes the attorney’s role in the asylum process. Our precedent tells us that competent attorney performance requires more. I believe that our court should instill a greater sense of professional responsibility in attorneys who represent asylum seekers.

It’s a powerful argument–and a cautionary tale for those of us who represent women from countries where FGM is widespread.  If Judge Pregerson’s position were adopted, attorneys would be required to ask about FGM not just in asylum cases, but also for clients seeking other forms of relief.  And we would–I suppose–be required to file FGM-based asylum applications for all clients who have been victims of the practice.  I have mixed feelings about this.

An anti-FGM poster in Kenya.

One problem is that it takes considerable time to develop an asylum case; particularly a case based on FGM.  For private attorneys, we would need to charge money for this time.  For non-profit attorneys, more time on one case means taking fewer cases overall.  Thus, fewer asylum seekers would be represented. 

Another problem is that adding an additional claim for relief may weaken the overall case.  It’s a question of strategy, but generally, if I have a strong basis for relief, I would rather not include a second, weaker claim for relief.  The weaker application tends to distract from the stronger, and increase the odds that both applications will fail.  Under the regime outlined by Judge Pregerson, I might feel obliged to include the FGM claim, even if I felt it would distract from the main focus of the case (if only for CYA–cover your ass–purposes).

On the other hand, if asylum might be available to a client based on FGM, the lawyer has a duty to at least explore that option.  I think it goes too far to label an attorney “ineffective” for failing to file an FGM asylum claim, especially where the attorney determines that such a claim is not the best strategy for the case.  However, where the attorney fails to ask about FGM when the client hales from a country where that practice is prevalent, there is a good argument that the attorney has provided ineffective assistance of counsel.