The BIA Rules on Frivolous Asylum Claims

The Board of Immigration Appeals earlier this week held that an Immigration Judge can make a determination that an asylum application is frivolous even in the absence of a final decision on the merits of that application. See Matter of X-M-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 322 (BIA 2010).  The Board also held that withdrawal of the alien’s asylum application after the required warnings and safeguards have been provided does not preclude a finding that the application is frivolous.

In Matter of X-M-C-, the alien filed an affirmative asylum application that contained false information.  After an interview at the Asylum Office in California, the case was referred to an Immigration Court.  During a court hearing, the alien admitted that her asylum claim and her testimony before the Asylum Officer were false.  She withdrew her application for asylum and applied for adjustment of status.  She also admitted to submitting fraudulent documents.  The IJ denied the adjustment of status holding that the later recantation of her story did “not waive the fact that a frivolous application has been filed.”  The BIA found:

[An] Immigration Judge’s authority to determine that an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum is not limited to circumstances in which the Immigration Judge makes a final determination on the merits of the application. The relevant provisions of the Act and the regulations clearly indicate that an inquiry into whether an application is frivolous can be triggered once the application is “made” or “filed.” 

“Consequently,” the Board held, “after a determination has been made that an asylum application is frivolous, a separate evaluation of the merits of the application is not necessary.”

The Board also determined that withdrawal of the asylum application does not prevent a determination that the application was frivolous:

The plain language of section 208(d)(6) clearly provides that an asylum application can be deemed frivolous once it is “made” and the required warnings have been given. Allowing the preemptive withdrawal of an application to prevent a finding of frivolousness would undermine both the plain language of, and the policy behind, section 208(d)(6)—as well as the potency of the required warnings. An alien, such as the respondent, who not only filed a frivolous application but also testified falsely in support of that application to an asylum officer could escape the consequences deliberately chosen by Congress to prevent such abuse of the system.

While applicants should be encouraged to recant false statements and withdraw false applications, the Immigration Judge and this Board are not prevented from finding that an application is frivolous simply because the applicant withdrew the application or recanted false statements after the appropriate warnings and safeguards were given, but prior to a decision on the merits.

The paragraph quoted immediately above lays bare the dilemma of cases involving fraudulent asylum applications.  On the one hand, we want to encourage aliens to recant false statements.  On the other hand, Congress has plainly indicated that aliens who make false statements should be punished.  The alien who makes up a claim where there is none has earned such treatment.  But aliens who have legitimate claims often “enhance” their story because they feel (or are told) that they should do so.  Such aliens are–to me at least–much more sympathetic.  In general, IJs seem to distinguish between these two categories of fraudsters, treating the latter better than the former. 

Matter of X-M-C- does not require frivolous findings and does not prevent IJs from distinguishing the different types of fraud.  It does, however, make clear that an alien cannot protect herself from a frivolous finding by withdrawing her asylum application.

Second Circuit Denies Chinese Asylum Cases En Masse

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently issued a summary order denying petitions for review in 24 separate cases involving Chinese asylum seekers.  The Court held:

Each of these petitioners, all Chinese citizens, challenges a decision of the BIA denying their applications for relief based on the birth of one or more children in the United States. For largely the same reasons this Court set forth in Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), we find no error in the BIA’s decision denying each application.

The Court’s Internal Operating Procedures allow for such orders, and this is not the first time the Court has denied cases like this en masse.  But are these mass denials fair to the petitioners and proper under the law?

First, some background.  In response to the “one family, one child” population control measures in China, Congress passed a law modifying the definition of “refugee” to include anyone subject to forced sterilization or forced abortion, as well as people who resist coercive population control measures.  This (predictably) led to hundreds of claims by Chinese nationals who had not been subject to past persecution or credible threats of future persecution.  Rather, these asylum seekers argued that because they had more than one child–which is not allowed under Chinese law–they would be subject to forced sterilization if returned to China, and should thus be granted asylum. 

Sometimes one is enough.

Because laws are enforced differently throughout China, the BIA found that cases involving Chinese nationals with more than one child must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether each alien has a well founded fear of persecution.  Thus, the BIA has restricted a provision that was arguably meant to be expansive.  In Jian Hui Shao, the Second Circuit accepted the case-by-case analysis endorsed by the BIA, and held that it would not disturb the BIA’s ruling unless it concluded that “no reasonable fact-finder could have failed to find in favor of petitioner.”

Turning to the summary order disposing of the 24 Chinese asylum cases, all of those cases involve Chinese nationals who fear persecution because they have more than one child.  Apparently, some of the asylum seekers were originally granted asylum, but those decisions were reversed by the BIA.  Other asylum seekers were denied by the Immigration Judge and the BIA.  The asylum seekers are represented by different attorneys and have all filed their own briefs.  Aside from the fact that they share similar legal issues, the cases are unrelated.  But the Court denied them en masse.

Whether intentional or not, the cursory review and mass denials send a message that the Second Circuit will not entertain Chinese forced-sterilization cases.  This seems inconsistent with our system of justice and unfair to the litigants, who deserve to know (1) that the Court actually considered their individual claim, and (2) the reason for the Court’s decision.  It is also unfair to the attorneys (the private attorneys and the Department of Justice attorneys) who have spent many hours briefing their cases.  I doubt a federal appeals court would issue mass denials in cases involving civil or criminal appeals.  Immigration cases should be treated with the same respect.  It is understandable that the Court would be frustrated with the large number of cases coming from the Board of Immigration Appeals.  However, all litigants deserve to have their cases heard and considered.  Perhaps the Second Circuit has carefully reviewed each litigant’s claim, but the summary orders and mass denials send a message that the Court simply does not care about these cases.

BS from CIS

The Center for Immigration Studies never seems to let the facts get in the way of attacking immigrants and those who advocate for them.  Most recently, Jessica Vaughan, CIS Director of Policy Studies, criticized Immigration Daily for holding a training on gang-based asylum claims.  Instead of discussing the actual subject of the training, which is not particularly controversial, Ms. Vaughan simply made up her own version of the event in order to attack Immigration Daily.  Of the training, she writes:

Learn how to establish that your gangster clients are “members of a particular social group,” that they deserve humanitarian protection due to their “political opinions” or “religion” (such as La Familia, the murderous Mexican cult-like cartel), and what the UN guidelines are on these oppressed individuals. This e-learning session was preceded by one on how to help your client get a waiver if they are denied a green card or refugee status because of their links to terrorist groups. No, this wasn’t in The Onion, it was in Immigration Daily, the leading e-newsletter of the immigration bar.

Ms. Vaughan did not find this description on the Immigration Daily website.  Rather, she made it up.  Gang-based asylum does not involve helping gang members enter the U.S.  Rather, it is about helping people who have been threatened by gangs.  But, Ms. Vaughan’s goal apparently is not to engage in intelligent debate or education; it is simply to denigrate and discredit those who advocate for people fleeing persecution. 

The Southern Poverty Law Center says of CIS: “it has always been part of a broad-based and well-planned effort to attack immigration in all forms.”  By making up phony arguments to influence the uninformed, Ms. Vaughan seems to be making their point for them.  If CIS wants to be taken seriously, maybe it should demonstrate a little integrity.  It can start by telling the truth.

Can DNA Stop Asylum Fraud?

The United Kingdom is experimenting with genetic testing as a method for reducing asylum fraud.  According to the UK Border Agency, falsifying nationality to gain political asylum has been a particular problem among East Africans (I recently discussed this problem here).  In response, the UKBA attempted to implement a program to genetically test East African asylum seekers to determine their country of origin.  The 2009 program was much criticized by scientists and immigrant advocates, and the British government ultimately shelved the plan.  However, the UK is continuing a smaller scale “proof of concept” project that is scheduled to finish up this month.  According to the UKBA: 

Participation in the project will be entirely voluntary, and will test whether there is the potential for these investigations to be supported by wider use of DNA testing and isotope analysis. Whilst this trial is being undertaken, no decisions on individual cases will be made using these techniques, and they will not be used for evidential purposes.

At the end of the project, the UKBA will evaluate the efficacy and ethics of the project and determine whether the technique could be used to augment its decision-making process in asylum cases. 

A UKBA scientist tests for Somali nationality.

The main objection to the project seems to be that it conflates nationality with ancestry.  A Somali citizen, for example, may be of Ethiopian ancestry.  The science website Singularity Hub reports:

[G]enes don’t relate to political borders. And there are strong doubts as to whether testing this particular group can even provide the slightest statistical reliability, mainly because of past and present population movements throughout the region.

Current TV reports on a second part of the test:

[An] applicant will be asked to give hair and fingernail samples; by looking at which forms of certain elements the samples contain, the government scientists hope to find evidence of the person’s diet and environment [to determine the country of origin]. But isotope specialist Tamsin O’Connell says the results won’t be specific enough to be meaningful. “It is very difficult to identify individuals to very specific locations using isotopes alone,” she said.

In other words, whether or not genetics and isotope analysis can be used to determine nationality is a dubious presumption.  Further, using genetic testing in this way raises ethical issues.  Current TV reports that geneticists and isotope specialists have referred to the project as “horrifying,” “naïve,” and “flawed.”

Writing for the Singularity Hub, Christopher de la Torre imagines a time when genetic testing might be able to identify a person’s country of origin: 

Using DNA to track populations and ancestry isn’t new, but regulating according to DNA opens a Pandora’s box of potential. As the rate of technological progress grows exponentially, it’s more important than ever to balance our ability with morality. 

Pennsylvania Man Sentenced for Asylum Fraud

From a June 10, 2010 Department of Justice press release:

David Lynn, 35, of Holland, PA, was sentenced today to 40 months in prison for leading an asylum fraud scheme that netted him and five co-defendants millions of dollars in illegal profits, announced United States Attorney Zane David Memeger. Lynn pleaded guilty, in October 2008, to one count of conspiracy, one count of visa/asylum fraud, one count of money laundering, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Lynn, who was charged with five co-defendants, ran a business that filed at least 380 bogus asylum applications for clients, between January 2003 and March 2007, charging an average of $8,000 for an application.

Investigators say Lynn posed as a lawyer.  According to an ABC News report, “only a handful of Lynn’s 380 clients from around the country made it through the system by claiming they would face oppression if they returned home.”  The majority of the aliens are in removal proceedings.  Some have already left the country knowing they were going to be deported.  According to another report, the perpetrators were Russian immigrants and most clients were from Russia, Ukraine, and Poland.

Unfortunately, it is a common pattern for unscrupulous immigrants to exploit their countrymen, who are naive about the American system and are ready to trust their own kind.  What’s most amazing to me is that a guy who lost the large majority of his cases and charged $8,000 per person–far more than most legitimate lawyers–seemed to maintain a booming business.  It’s a sad testament to the gullibility and desperation of the clients, some of whom may have lost out on bona fide claims.  Other clients were likely complicit in the fraud, and it’s harder to muster sympathy for them. 

I believe the best way to stop fraud is to go after people like Mr. Lynn, who blatantly take advantage of a system that is designed to help the most vulnerable.  By stopping Mr. Lynn, the DOJ has helped to preserve the integrity of the asylum process.  Congratulations to those involved in the investigation, and keep up the good work.

Two Unpublished BIA Victories for Mentally Ill Respondents

Here are two recent decisions from the BIA involving mentally ill defendants who faced persecution in their homelands:

(1) Professor Muneer Ahmad of the Yale Law School Worker & Immigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic reports that the BIA has reversed a decision by the IJ denying Convention Against Torture relief to a mentally ill Haitian man.  The Haitian man argued that he would be jailed in Haiti and that he would not receive his medication.  Without medication, the man would not be able to comply or adapt to the conditions in prison.  As a result of this non-compliance, he would be beaten and tortured in prison.  The BIA found that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured.  The Board’s decision reversed the IJ and remanded the case for a grant of CAT relief.  The student attorneys on the case were Alice Hwang, Dale Kotchka-Alanes, Rebecca Scholtz, and Matt Vogel.

(2) Attorney Bob Jobe represented the respondent in another unpublished BIA decision.  In that case, the Board originally denied the claim, but the Ninth Circuit remanded to assess whether “Peruvians with serious chronic mental disabilities” constitutes a particular social group.  On remand, the BIA held: “Mental disabilities are clearly immutable characteristics in that those suffering from them cannot change their disability. Furthermore, people with serious and chronic mental disabilities are socially visible and the evidence of record establishes that [in Peru] they are often discriminated against and treated in an inhumane manner.” 

Mazel Tov to all on these successful outcomes.

A Short “Wish List” for the Refugee Protection Act

The RPA provides important new protections to asylum seekers, particularly the most vulnerable asylum seekers such as people who are pro se or detained.  However, I can think of a couple important issues that are not addressed.  Below are some problems that my clients have faced over and over again, and some suggested solutions.

The Asylum Clock 

The broken asylum clock isn't even correct twice a day

Within the circle of attorneys who represent asylum seekers, the “asylum clock” may be the most discussed problem in need of resolution (Penn State Dickinson School of Law recently issued a comprehensive report about the asylum clock). When a client files an affirmative application for asylum, the clock starts to run.  When the clock reaches 150 days, the applicant may file for an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”).  The EAD is very important because it allows an asylum seeker to work legally in the United States, and serves as a form of identification.  The problem is, if the alien does anything to delay his case, the clock stops, and generally will not re-start.  So, for example, if an alien is represented by counsel, and the attorney cannot accept a particular court date due to a conflict, the clock stops and the alien never receives an EAD.  Also, when an unrepresented asylum seeker asks for more time to find an attorney, the clock stops.  It is usually impossible to restart the clock. 

Aliens who enter the United States without inspection or aliens who file for asylum after one year in the U.S. do not have a clock, and it is usually not possible for them to obtain an EAD.

Thus, many asylum seekers endure one to two year waits (which are common in Immigration Court) without the ability to work legally, and without any form of identification.

One possible solution to this problem is to give the Immigration Judges more authority to grant an EAD.  If the alien is deliberately causing delay in his case, the IJ should not grant an EAD.  But where the delay is not caused by the alien or is reasonable, the alien should receive an EAD.

Employment Authorization Document

A second area in need of reform is the EAD itself.  Aliens granted asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the UN Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) are entitled to an EAD.  The EAD is valid for one year and must then be renewed.  The validity period of the EAD should be changed to at least two years.

Aliens with asylum generally apply for their lawful permanent residency (i.e., their green card) after one year.  However, aliens who have withholding of removal or CAT relief are not eligible to become LPRs.  Such aliens must renew their EADs every year.  This can be problematic for a number of reasons.  First, the cost to renew is $340.00 every year.  For aliens with limited means, this sum may be prohibitive.  Second, assuming the alien remembers to file on time, the new EAD may or may not arrive prior to the expiration of the old EAD.  If the new EAD does not arrive in time, the alien’s job might be jeopardized, as employers will often terminate employees without a valid EAD.  Third, many states link the driver’s license to the EAD, so when the EAD expires, the driver’s license expires.  Even if the EAD arrives on time, there may be a delay in renewing the driver’s license.  The alien could be left without a valid driver’s license (or any valid ID).

These problems would be greatly reduced if the EAD were valid for two (or more) years, instead of one year. 

Finally, Some Media Attention

The RPA has been largly ignored by the media.  Last week, Josh Shahyar had an article in the Huffington Post, “The Immigration Bill No One Is Talking About.”  Hopefully the article adds some momentum to the push for this worthy piece of legislation.

President Obama’s Aunt Wins Asylum

An Immigration Judge in Boston granted asylum to President Obama’s aunt Zeituni Onyango, a Kenyan national who has been in the U.S. since 2000.  Ms. Onyango first applied for asylum in 2002.  She was initially denied, but then either appealed or reopened her case (I have found nothing definitive about the course of the litigation).  Earlier today, the IJ granted her application for asylum. 

Obama's aunt holds a photo of herself and a little-known state senator

At least as far as I can tell, the basis for Ms. Onyango’s claim has not been made public.  My guess is that after Obama was elected president (or at least after he became nationally and internationally known), Ms. Onyango filed a motion to reopen her case and asserted that she would face persecution from people who wished to harm her family (the Obama family).  Given the various threats to our country, this seems a reasonable claim.  Although perhaps the possibility of her facing harm in Kenya is remote (Obama’s grandmother is living there peacefully), it’s easy to understand why an IJ would be reluctant to send her back.  She would make a tempting target for extremists, and it would be a blow to the U.S. if she were harmed.  Under these circumstances–and given the fairly low threshold for asylum–it’s not a surprise that the IJ granted Ms. Onyango’s claim.

Professional Obama-hater Michelle Malkin and others have raised the question of whether Ms. Onyango received special treatment because of her relationship with the President.  Of course, I have no idea (and neither do they), but special treatment hardly seems necessary in a case like Ms. Onyango’s.  I once represented an Afghani woman who received a fellowship to study in the United States.  A university brought her here and supported her, and the local press covered her progress for four years.  Towards the end of her fellowship, extremists in her country threatened her, and we applied for asylum.  I argued that she was a prime target for anti-American extremists because of her relationship with our country–had she been harmed in Afghanistan, it would have been seen as a major victory for our enemies.  The Asylum Office granted her application.  Ms. Onyango’s situation was similar to my client’s, in that our enemies would view an attack against her as an attack against the United States.  Not surprisingly, the IJ was not willing to take that risk.

The BIA on Frivolous Asylum Applications

Biao Yang probably isn’t the first man to tell an exaggerated story about his courage in defense of a woman’s honor. Similarly self-aggrandizing stories have no doubt been told in countless bars and around hundreds of water coolers.

Narrative license of this sort usually carries little risk. A drinking buddy or co-worker might express disbelief by making reference to bovine excrement.

But the personal consequences of Yang’s embellishments are far more serious, as they will likely result in his deportation and the imposition of a lifetime bar to future immigration benefits. The consequences of Yang’s narrative excesses also had a broader effect, as they were the focus of a recent BIA decision that added to the administrative corpus of immigration law by clarifying the standards under which asylum claims are determined to have been made frivolously.

TOUGH GUY

Yang, a Chinese national, arrived in Chicago in 2002. After touching down, he told immigration officials at O’Hare that he had fled his country because “family planning authorities” – bureaucrats tasked with enforcing the country’s “One Child” policies – had forced his girlfriend to abort her pregnancy and that they wanted to arrest him.

Poster extolling the virtues of the one child policy

The embellishments would come in an asylum application filed 18 months later. In that application, Yang asserted that he got into a scuffle with and injured one of the abortionist bureaucrats who had come to his house to escort his girlfriend to the hospital. He further claimed to have been beaten and detained for his fearless acts. And then he claimed that he made a prison break and left the country.

IJ DECISION AND SECOND CIRCUIT REMAND

None of these details had been mentioned during the airport interview, however. This and other suspicious aspects of Yang’s story – including chronological discrepancies , “rank inconsistencies” within his testimony, and the sheer “implausibility” of his prison-break story – led an immigration judge to render an “adverse credibility determination.”

The result was denial of Yang’s asylum claim. But the IJ further held that these inconsistencies indicated that Yang’s asylum claim had been filed frivolously – which resulted in the imposition of a lifetime bar to future immigration benefits.

The IJ’s decision was affirmed by the BIA.  However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit remanded because the case exposed vagueness in the existing BIA standard for making a “frivolousness” determination. Those standards included:

[A] specific finding by the Immigration Judge or the Board that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous application … [and] … sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that a material element of the asylum application was deliberately fabricated

The Second Circuit examined:

to what extent the IJ is required to set out his or her factual findings to support a frivolousness determination separately from the adverse credibility determination and to what extent he or she is permitted to incorporate by reference the findings made to support an adverse credibility determination.

BIA CLARIFICATIONS

On remand, Matter of B-Y-, 25 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2010), the BIA made the following clarifications:

Factual findings made in reaching an adverse credibility determination can be incorporated into the findings made in reaching a frivolousness determination … but will not be sufficient … the frivolousness determination requires additional, explicit findings of “materiality” and “deliberate fabrication.” 

The BIA stated:

In this case, as is often the situation, fact-finding regarding credibility overlaps with fact-finding as to whether an asylum application was frivolously filed. Both determinations involve the identification of inconsistencies and discrepancies in the asylum claim and consideration of any explanations offered for them. There may be circumstances where the pertinent facts do not overlap, and separate factual findings by an Immigration Judge will be necessary.

However, neither fairness nor clarity requires an Immigration Judge to separate and repeat those aspects of the credibility determination that overlap with the frivolousness determination.

… The frivolousness determination, however, requires explicit findings as to “materiality” and “deliberate fabrication” that are not required for an adverse credibility determination. As we indicated in Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. at 156, “[T]he Immigration Judge must separately address the question of frivolousness, including a discussion of the evidence supporting a finding that the respondent deliberately fabricated a material element of the asylum claim.”

The Refugee Protection Act and the “Central Reason” for Persecution

This is part four in a series of posts about the Refugee Protection Act (“RPA”), a bill introduced by Senators Leahy and Levin in the United States Senate.  The RPA would modify the requirements for asylum by changing the requirement that a “central reason” for the persecution is a protected ground.

In order to qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, particular social group).  The REAL ID Act (effective May 11, 2005) modified this definition, and the law now requires that “at least one central reason” for the persecution must be a protected ground.  The BIA found that this new requirement did not “radically alter[]” existing law. See In re: J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2007)

While the law may not have been radically altered, the REAL ID Act makes it more difficult for asylum seekers to obtain relief.  I worked on a case in the Fourth Circuit (ably litigated at the agency level by the University of Maryland Law School Clinic) where an El Salvadoran man had been repeatedly harassed and beaten by members of the MS-13 gang.  The gang attacked him for several reasons: (1) they did not want him to date a certain girl; (2) they wanted to steal his money; and (3) they did not want him to attend the Seventh Day Adventist Church.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) specifically found that the harm faced by the asylum seeker rose to the level of persecution, and she told him: “I think you are in a terrible situation and I could not have more sympathy for you.”  However, both the IJ and the BIA found that the “central reasons” for the persecution were that the gang did not want my client to date the girl and the gang wanted to rob him–these are not protected grounds.  The BIA found that “even assuming… religion was one motive, we do not find his religion to be ‘at least one central reason’ for the persecution.”  The Fourth Circuit agreed and denied our Petition for Review. See Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2009).   

What motivates this guy?

The difficulty in Quinteros-Mendoza was that the IJ had to determine the motivation of the gang members.  It is difficult enough to establish the motivation of a persecutor, let alone to rank that motivation as “one central reason” for the persecution.  The RPA would relax this requirement.  The law would be changed so that the applicant must prove only that a protected ground is “a factor in the applicant’s persecution or fear of persecution.” 

Where an asylum applicant faces persecution, he should not be required to demonstrate the motivation for his persecutor’s actions with such specificity.  The RPA would correct this problem.

The Refugee Protection Act and Particular Social Groups

This is part three in a series about the Refugee Protection Act.  The RPA provides guidance about what constitutes a “particular social group.”

A refugee is defined as a person with a well founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A).  There has been much litigation concerning what constitutes a “particular social group.”  

The Refugee Protection Act provides helpful guidance on what constitutes a “particular social group.”  The RPA states:

For purposes of determinations under the Act, any group whose members share a characteristic that is either immutable or fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person’s human rights such that the person should not be required to change it, shall be deemed a particular social group, without any additional requirement.

While this provision makes the definition of “particular social group” more specific, it still leaves open at least one important question: Will the definition of “particular social group” apply to former members of criminal organizations?  In the Seventh Circuit case, Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009), the court held that former gang members might constitute a particular social group.  If the Refugee Protection Act defines a “particular social group” as “any group whose members share a characteristic that is… immutable,” then former gang members would qualify as a particular social group.  Current–as opposed to former–gang members would not qualify as a particular social group because gang membership is not immutable.  In other words, it is possible to quit the gang.  Former gang membership is immutable, because it is not possible for an alien to change the fact that he once belonged to a criminal gang.  Under the RPA, it seems that a former member of any organization would be part of a particular social group

Ex-members of the knitting circle form a particular social group

Even if former gang members constitute a particular social group, they would likely be ineligible for asylum based on criminal and security-related grounds.

I have worked on several cases where former gang members feared persecution by gangs.  In one case, several members of my client’s family had been killed.  My client was granting withholding of removal based on his particular social group (his family; not his former gang membership).  In another case, my client was denied relief where the IJ found that he did not belong to a particular social group.  In both cases, the clients faced harm from the gang because they quit the gang.  The danger of gang violence against former gang members is very real.  In a well known case, Edgar Chocoy, a 16-year-old former member of the MS-13 gang, was ordered removed from the United States.  Shortly after he returned to Guatemala, gang members murdered him. 

The Refugee Protection Act should provide protection for former gang members who face harm in their countries.  While we must be cognizant of security concerns (and of offering benefits to criminals), we must also recognize the severe threat faced by legitimate former gang members. 

The Refugee Protection Act and the Material Support Bar

This is part dieux in our series of posts about the Refugee Protection Act.  Today’s topic is the “Material Support Bar,” INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), which states that an alien who commits an act that he “knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support” to a terrorist organization is inadmissible.  As written, the law makes no exception for instances where the alien has been coerced into providing support.  The RPA would change that.

About a year ago, I represented an elderly Iraqi Christian woman who had received threats from unknown people seeking to extort money.  The people threatened to murder her son.  As a result of the threats, and in order to save her son, the women gave money to the extortionists.  Given that these people were likely terrorists, the woman faced a bar to obtaining asylum in the U.S.  We relied on a USCIS memorandum, which allowed for limited exceptions to the material support bar in the case of duress, and the woman received asylum.  A pro se applicant might not have access to that memorandum, and might not be able to relate the relevant facts necessary to meet the exception to the material support bar.

The Refugee Protection Act creates an exception to the material support bar for people who have been coerced to provide material support to terrorists.  This would reduce or eliminate the problem of denying asylum to people who have been victimized by terrorists.

The Refugee Protection Act and the One Year Asylum Bar

The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 is currently working its way through Congress.  The proposed law makes some pretty significant changes to the asylum laws of the United States.  Most advocacy groups are endorsing the bill, though it seems not to have captured the attention of the mainstream media.  As an attorney who represents asylum seekers, I thought I would share my perspective on the legislation by examining how it would have affected some of my cases had it been the law.  The RFA (or at least my copy of the RFA) is 78 pages long, so there is a lot to discuss.  So this will be the first part in a series of posts about the RFA.  Today’s topic: The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 eliminates the requirement that an asylum seeker files for asylum within one year of arrival in the United States.  

The current law puts the "dead" in deadline

INA § 208(a)(2)(B) states that in order to qualify for asylum an alien must demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence that the application [for asylum] has been filed within 1 year after the date of alien’s arrival in the United States.”  If the alien fails to timely file for asylum, he or she will not qualify for that relief, but may still apply for withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3) or relief pursuant to the UN Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

For aliens represented by competent counsel, it is often possible to demonstrate “changed circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances,” either of which can excuse the one year filing deadline. See INA § 208(a)(2)(D).  In my own practice, I have encountered many cases where the alien has not filed within one year of arrival.  In most cases, we have been able to demonstrate “changed circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances,” and the alien has qualified for asylum.

For aliens who are unrepresented, the one-year bar presents a barrier to legitimate claims.  The purpose of the bar is to help eliminate fraudulent claims.  However, there are legitimate reasons why an alien might fail to file for asylum within one year of arrival in our country.  Some examples:

Avoidance – I had one case where a political activist from Zimbabwe was arrested and then raped by the police.  After she came to the U.S., the psychological trauma the alien suffered caused her to avoid re-visiting the events in her country (which would have been necessary in order to prepare her asylum application).  As a result, she did not complete the asylum application within one year.  The Asylum Office denied her case because she failed to file for asylum within one year of her arrival (she was pro se), and her case was referred to an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  The IJ ultimately granted asylum (with the agreement of the DHS attorney) after we demonstrated that the alien’s failure to file within one year was due to “extraordinary circumstances,” i.e., the psychological trauma of her rape, and the resulting avoidance of re-visiting those events.  Had this alien been unrepresented, she might not have been able to demonstrate that she qualified for an exception to the one-year rule.

Alternative Relief – I represented a man from a prominent family in Peru.  After a change in government, the man received anonymous death threats and was followed by unknown people.  He came to the United States, but did not file for asylum because he expected to obtain his residency based on marriage to a U.S. citizen.  The marriage did not succeed, so he applied late for asylum.  He was not represented by counsel.  The Asylum Office referred his case to the IJ based on the failure to comply with the one-year filing requirement.  As a compromise, the DHS attorney and the IJ agreed to grant of withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3).  As a result, the alien has been able to remain in the U.S., but he repeatedly had to appear before the Detention and Removal Office, officers in that office improperly threatened to remove him to a third country, and he has had to renew his work permit every year, which makes it difficult to maintain employment.  If he marries a U.S. citizen, he could re-open his case and obtain his residency based on the marriage.

Changed Circumstances & Other Obligations – In another example, I represented a Tuareg woman from Niger who feared return to her country after the government began a war with the Tuareg people and after her grandmother was killed by a land mine.  The woman, who represented herself, failed to file for asylum within one year because (1) the conflict was dormant when she first arrived in the United States, so she did not fear return, and (2) she was the primary caretaker for her father, and was too occupied to prepare her case.  Her sister, who had the exact same case and also filed late, received asylum from the Asylum Office.  My client’s case was referred to the IJ, and after much discussion, the IJ and the DHS attorney agreed to a grant of asylum.       

In the above examples, the one-year bar resulted in wasted judicial resources and hardship for legitimate asylum seekers.  Had these aliens been unrepresented before the IJ, their cases would likely have been denied (all the cases were denied by the Asylum Office, where the aliens were without representation).  Thus, these aliens—who were later determined to be legitimate refugees—were initially denied asylum solely because they had not complied with the one-year filing requirement for asylum.  Had they not been represented before the IJ, these aliens likely would have been ordered removed to countries where they faced persecution. 

The Refugee Protection Act would eliminate the one year filing deadline, and would protect legitimate asylum seekers such as the aliens discussed above.

More from the Mariana Islands

I will be applying for asylum here in 2015

Maybe I need a vacation, but I keep coming back to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands – the United States’s possession (technically a commonwealth in political union with the U.S.) that adopted the Immigration and Nationality Act on November 28, 2009.

Among the strange new laws in this remote corner of the Pacific is the provision that aliens seeking asylum in the CNMI cannot do so until January 1, 2015.  In the interim, aliens fearing persecution can apply for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) or the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  Chief Immigration Judge Brian M. O’Leary has issued a memorandum discussing the transition to the INA.  Chief Judge O’Leary points to a number of “novel” legal issues that might arise:

There may also be a variety of issues involving the provision that aliens “physically present in or arriving in” the CNMI cannot apply for asylum until January 1, 2015. For example, the law is silent on whether an alien who transited through the CNMI en route to another area of the United States is barred from applying for asylum until January 1, 2015. Other issues may involve what type of legal status aliens who have previously been granted refugee protection under CNMI law are entitled to.

These issues and others seem like fertile ground for litigation.  Maybe we will revisit the Mariana Islands soon.

Singh v. Holder: Is Attorney Error to Blame?

A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit reveals how attorney error can destroy an alien’s asylum case.

In Singh v. Holder, No. 08-70434 (9th Cir. April 19, 2010), the Ninth Circuit concluded that an IJ may require corroborating evidence even where an alien has testified credibly.  In the underlying case, the question before the IJ was whether Mr. Singh had filed for asylum within one year of his arrival in the United States (in general, an alien who does not file for asylum within one year of arriving in the U.S. is ineligible for asylum).  The IJ found that Mr. Singh testified credibly about his arrival date in the U.S., but the IJ concluded that Mr. Singh had failed to prove his entry date by “clear and convincing” evidence because he did not submit any additional evidence of his entry date.

The Ninth Circuit found that the IJ could require corroboration of the entry date.  The Court held:

With section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) [the REAL ID Act], Congress has expressly empowered the IJ to require corroborating evidence even when the applicant has provided otherwise credible testimony. Should the applicant fail to offer corroboration, the IJ may conclude that despite the applicant’s credible testimony, he has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to asylum relief. Accordingly, the IJ’s conclusion that Singh’s uncorroborated testimony was insufficient to carry his burden to prove his date of entry was proper.

This result is not that surprising.  The REAL ID Act, which went into effect on May 11, 2005, provides that, “Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”  In Singh, the Court concluded that evidence corroborating Mr. Singh’s entry date was readily available:

This is the sort of fact which is “easily subject to verification,'” whether by some form of official documentation or by supporting documents of a more informal variety, i.e., affidavits or letters from family, friends, or traveling companions.  Travelers typically accumulate paper as they move, such as receipts from gas stations, motels, and restaurants, and often take snapshots providing dating information, and reaching a refuge from persecution might well generate a particular desire to preserve souvenirs of arrival. Accordingly, it is eminently “reasonable to expect” an applicant to provide some corroborating evidence of his date of entry

While I am not sure I agree that people fleeing persecution “typically accumulate paper as they move,” Mr. Singh should at least have tried to get evidence concerning his entry.  Had he made an effort to obtain corroboration, he would likely have satisfied the REAL ID Act’s requirement to either obtain the evidence or demonstrate that the evidence is not reasonably available.

The REAL ID Act went into effect in 2005.  According to the Ninth Circuit decision, the IJ informed Mr. Singh’s counsel at an initial hearing to obtain evidence concerning the date of entry.  Either Mr. Singh’s attorney asked his client for the evidence or he did not.  If he asked and Mr. Singh failed to make any effort to obtain the evidence, then Mr. Singh is to blame for the loss.  If the attorney failed to instruct Mr. Singh to get evidence, then the attorney is to blame.