Asylum Offices and USCIS Will Start Reopening Next Week (Maybe)

As you might have noticed, USCIS offices have been closed for all in-person appointments–including asylum interviews and biometric appointments–since March 18, 2020. Now, USCIS has announced that it “is preparing some domestic offices to reopen and resume non-emergency public services on or after June 4.” What does this mean? What will the “new normal” look like at USCIS? Are we all going to die?

The first thing I notice about the USCIS announcement is that it is kind-of vague. “Some domestic offices” will reopen? I am not sure what this means. I suppose we will have to wait and see which offices actually reopen. Also, “on or after June 4” could be next week or it could be in 2099. In any event, it seems clear that USCIS is trying to get things moving again. Indeed, one of my clients is scheduled for an interview on June 29 in the Arlington Asylum Office and I have heard of other applicants receiving notices for interviews there as well. 

An Asylum Division manager explains how they will reopen their offices.

Second, it seems that the new interview process will be a bit different than what we are used to–

In accordance with social distancing guidelines, and due to the length of asylum interviews, asylum offices expect to conduct video-facilitated asylum interviews, where the applicants sit in one room and the interviewing officer sits in another room. Asylum offices will use available technology, including mobile devices provided by the agency, to ensure that the officer, applicant, interpreter and representative can fully and safely participate in the interview while maintaining social distancing.

This short description raises a few concerns related to (1) safety, (2) due process, and (3) security. In terms of safety, if the Asylum Officer is in his own room, that seems relatively safe, at least for the officer (though the officers still need to get to work and stay healthy in an environment with many coworkers). For the applicants, the situation is less clear. Presumably, they will have to wait in a waiting room. In normal times, we often spend considerable time waiting, as interviews are often delayed–sometimes for hours. I suppose applicants could be sent outside (to wander aimlessly?) and then contacted by phone when the officer is ready to see them. This would at least avoid overcrowding in the waiting area. Also, normally, asylum applicants have their fingerprints and photo taken when they check in to the interview. This often entails waiting in line while a staff member struggles with a fussy computer. Whether the offices have sufficient space to “social distance” while waiting to check in, I do not know.

During the interview, applicants are entitled to bring an interpreter and a lawyer. Will all those people share a room? No offense to my clients, but this is not very comforting. Will each of us have our own room? That seems to be the plan, at least in Virginia. Due to security concerns, Asylum Officers never left us unattended during interviews, even for a second, and so I am guessing that they will need empty rooms to put us into. But the rooms won’t be completely empty, since we will need video equipment (and hopefully chairs), and so I am not sure how that will work. Also, what stops us from leaving the room and wandering the halls of the Asylum Office (I myself might go in search of the mythical room where all my lost files are located). And where are they going to get all those empty rooms? My guess is that the “new normal” will involve far fewer interviews than the old normal, but I suppose the powers-that-be figure some interviews are better than none.

Another concern is due process. Asylum seekers are entitled to a fair procedure. I know from my experience in Immigration Court that video hearings are more difficult and less fair than in-person hearings, and I imagine the same will be true of asylum interviews. There is much that is easier in person. For example, at the beginning of the interview, the officer reviews the I-589 form and makes corrections. Sometimes, the officer wants to look at documents with the applicant. These things will be difficult to do if the officer and the applicant are in two different places. Also, if the lawyer, interpreter, and applicant are in different rooms, communication between them will be more challenging. Aside from this, it is simply more difficult to talk to a person by video (as we all now know from innumerable, interminable Zoom chats). This difficulty will be compounded if the applicant is wearing a mask, which may be necessary in the event she shares a room with her attorney or interpreter. All these protective measures will make it more difficult to interact with the Asylum Officer and will make an already stressful situation worse. In short, under the current circumstances, there will be significant barriers to receiving a fair adjudication.

An additional concern is security. Will the video equipment be secure, or might it be hacked by nefarious actors who want to harm asylum seekers? I do not know, but the federal government’s track record here is mixed, and for people seeking asylum, confidentiality is an important concern.

How does USCIS plan to keep asylum applicants safe? The agency has issued the following guidelines for entering USCIS facilities–

  • Visitors may not enter a USCIS facility if they:
    • Have any symptoms of COVID-19, including cough, fever or difficulty breathing;
    • Have been in close contact with anyone known or suspected to have COVID-19 in the last 14 days; or
    • Have been individually directed to self-quarantine or self-isolate by a health care provider or public health official within the last 14 days.
  • Visitors may not enter the facility more than 15 minutes prior to their appointment (30 minutes for naturalization ceremonies).
  • Hand sanitizer will be provided for visitors at entry points. 
  • Members of the public must wear facial coverings that cover both the mouth and nose when entering facilities. Visitors may be directed to briefly remove their face covering to confirm identity or take their photograph. There will be markings and physical barriers in the facility; visitors should pay close attention to these signs to ensure they follow social distancing guidelines.
  • Individuals are encouraged to bring their own black or blue ink pens.

My local office (Arlington) announced that telephonic appearances are not permitted for applicants because the Asylum Office must check identification. Also, the Asylum Office does not have any procedures for attorneys to appear telephonically (strange, since they do have telephones). All documents must be submit at least 72 hours before the interview, as there is apparently a new policy that requires 72 hours to pass before anyone can touch incoming mail. Finally, the Asylum Office will have a “very liberal” rescheduling policy, and so applicants can reschedule by email. Whether these same changes will apply at other offices, I do not know, but I imagine that all offices will follow similar procedures.

Like every other organization trying to reopen, USCIS is engaged in a difficult balancing act. How can they fulfill their mission and keep people safe? In my opinion, at the moment, they cannot do both. Given all the restrictions and contortions needed to make interviews happen, I expect they will only be able to interview a token few applicants. Under those circumstances, I do not see how it is worthwhile to endanger their staff and clientele (and anyone who comes into contact with them).

On the other hand, I know that many asylum seekers would be willing to take the risk. Not because they are reckless, but because they are so desperate to have their cases resolved and to reunite with family members. I can’t blame them for this.

There is no easy resolution to the dilemma. I hope USCIS will move cautiously, and I hope they will be able to keep people safe and provide them with fair interviews. We shall see.

USCIS’s Budget Woes – And What Can Be Done About It

Due to the coronavirus pandemic and the Trump Administration’s harsh anti-immigration policies, USCIS–the agency that oversees much of the nation’s immigration and asylum system–expects that “application and petition receipts will drop by approximately 61 percent” through the end of the current fiscal year (September 30, 2020). As a result, the agency is seeking a “one-time emergency request for funding” from Congress for $1.2 billion “to ensure we can carry out our mission of administering our nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity, and protecting the American people.” The agency plans to pay back this money by “imposing a 10 percent surcharge to USCIS application fees.” Presumably, this is on top of the dramatically increased fees the agency announced late last year (but which have yet to be implemented).

Unlike most government agencies, USCIS is largely user-funded. Indeed, the agency derives 97% of its budget from fees paid by its “customers” (immigrants and petitioners). These fees also largely cover the cost of the asylum system, which is currently free to applicants (though USCIS’s recent fee proposal includes a $50 fee for asylum). According to a USCIS spokesperson, without the injection of cash from Congress, the agency “would be unable to fund its operations in a matter of months.” This could result in “drastic actions,” which might include staff reductions. Already, USCIS employees have been notified that the agency is “severely strapped for cash due to the low number of new applications being filed,” and overtime, travel, and purchases have been put on hold.

In short, things don’t look good for USCIS. So what can be done?

There are lots of ways USCIS can increase revenue without raising fees.

USCIS is seeking additional funding from Congress and plans to pay back the money by increasing fees. But it seems to me there are better and more equitable ways raise money.

One idea is to expand the use of premium processing. Currently, certain forms for employment-based immigration allow the petitioner to pay an additional fee ($1,440) and have their case processed more expeditiously. Cases that ordinarily take many months are processed within 15 calendar days (this is the equivalent of strapping a warp drive engine to a Conestoga wagon). Paying for premium processing does not necessarily mean you receive a final decision in 15 days, but at least you get a response–either an approval, a denial or a request for additional evidence. In my experience, even if you receive a request for evidence and your case takes longer than 15 days, it is still adjudicated much more quickly than if you did not use premium processing.

I have long advocated that premium processing should be available to asylum seekers, but why limit this service to certain types of cases? Why not make it available to all USCIS applications and petitions? The agency does not have to stick with its 15-day time frame or the current fee. Maybe there could be different levels of premium processing with different time frames and different fees. Maybe some types of applications are simply not amenable to premium processing. It seems to me that these things are knowable and could be explored.

The broader use of premium processing would benefit not just those aliens who can afford it (though they would benefit the most). The injection of additional money into the system would ultimately benefit everyone. Also, by removing premium-processing cases from the mix, USCIS would have fewer “regular” cases to deal with, which would presumably allow them to move more quickly through those cases.

The way I see it, premium processing is an all around win: It helps those who pay for it, provides an option for those who need it (since some people have very good reasons to expedite their cases), improves processing times even for those who do not pay for it, and brings more money into the system, which could help keep costs down for all of USCIS’s customers.

Another idea to raise funds would be to create an online legal aid service within USCIS. There are currently private, internet-based organizations that provide fee-based assistance filling forms, filing applications, and in some cases, providing legal advice. Lawyers (such as myself) tend to be wary of these organizations, as some seem less-than legitimate and because they often cannot provide the comprehensive help needed to identify problems and resolve complex cases (also, of course, they undercut our fees, which most of us find less than endearing). But for ordinary cases, without undue complications, such services can provide cost-effective assistance to people who otherwise might not be able to afford a lawyer or secure pro bono counsel.

If private organizations can provide this type of limited legal assistance, why can’t USCIS? They certainly have the expertise. Also, it is not unprecedented for government agencies to provide help to their constituents. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs maintains a list of accredited representatives who help veterans and their family members for no fee or a low fee. If the VA can offer this service for free, why can’t USCIS offer a similar service for a reasonable fee? The assistance could take the form of “smart” fill-able forms that provide comprehensive advice about how to do it yourself, and maybe a hot-line or in-person office, where the applicant could obtain help. Fees would vary–automated assistance might be inexpensive (or at least comparable to the existing private agencies that provide this service), while “live” help would be more expensive. If this model is economically viable for private organizations, I imagine it would turn a profit for the federal government as well.

Like premium processing, an in-house legal aid program would benefit everyone. It would directly help the people who could afford it, but it would also help reduce the burden on existing non-profit legal aid organizations, and so they could serve more people in need. 

There are plenty of other ideas as well. For example, USCIS could re-instate adjustment of status based on INA § 245(i), where a person who entered the U.S. illegally can pay a penalty and obtain their residency based on a family or employment petition (currently, and with rare exceptions, people who entered illegally need to leave the U.S. to obtain residency). Also, USCIS could also stop wasting manpower and postage by arbitrarily returning applications for minor mistakes (which previously were addressed at the interview).

As you can see, USCIS has different options for increasing revenue. But given the Administration’s hostility towards immigrants, it is not surprising that they are choosing to raise fees, which is the least equitable and most damaging path available to them. With a minimum of creativity, they could come up with alternative solutions that would raise money, improve efficiency, and benefit migrants. Unfortunately, the primary concern of USCIS is not really the agency’s economic well-being. Rather, USCIS wants to weaponize fees in the same way it has weaponized bureaucratic procedures–to reduce immigration and prevent eligible people from obtaining status in the United States. 

What If Joe Biden’s Accuser Was Held to the Same Standard as Witnesses in Immigration Court?

In 1993, Tara Reade was a legislative aid for then-Senator Joe Biden. In 2019, she went public with an allegation that Mr. Biden “used to put his hand on my shoulder and run his finger up my neck.” She says she complained about the behavior after it happened, but then faced retaliation, which caused her to leave her job. In March of this year, Ms. Reade stated that on one occasion, when she was alone with Senator Biden, he pushed her against the wall “and then his hands were on me and underneath my clothes. And then he went down my skirt, but then up inside it and he penetrated me with his fingers. And he was kissing me….” In her 2020 statement, Ms. Reade indicated that she made a contemporaneous complaint alleging sexual harassment, but not sexual assault. Several people–including Ms. Reade’s brother and a friend–have stated that she told them about the assault years ago, and there is some evidence that Ms. Reade made a complaint during her time in the Senate.

Ms. Reade’s allegations got me thinking: How would her testimony and evidence be evaluated under the standard applied to asylum seekers testifying in Immigration Court? Let’s start with the legal standard, as set forth in INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii)

[A] trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record… and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.

For-Biden touching or Reade-iculous allegation? You decide.

So right away, we can see an issue: Ms. Reade states that she complained about sexual harassment in 1993 and she publicly claimed sexual harassment in 2019, but then in 2020, she stated that she was also the victim of a sexual assault. This is an inconsistency.

But an inconsistent statement is not necessarily fatal to a credibility determination. Applicants must be given an opportunity to explain any inconsistencies. In our case, Ms. Reade stated that she did not disclose the assault in 1993 because she was traumatized, and that she did not mention it in 2019 because she was uncomfortable with the interviewer’s questions and fearful of a backlash against her. She decided to reveal the full story in 2020 because she felt she needed to do so for her daughter and for other victims of sexual assault, and because she felt Joe Biden should apologize.

Once a witness provides an explanation, the decision-maker has a certain amount of leeway to evaluate that explanation. According to the Board of Immigration Appeals, “An Immigration Judge is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even if plausible, where there are other permissible views of the evidence based on the record.” Where does this leave us? Nowhere too helpful, I would submit.

On the one hand, we could find Ms. Reade’s testimony incredible, since it has changed over time and her most recent (and most serious) allegations are different from what she allegedly claimed in 1993 and what she described in 2019. On the other hand, she has presented an explanation for the inconsistency, which is based on the trauma and shame she suffered, as well as on her fear of further harm. Given this evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could decide either way on credibility, and such a decision would likely survive an appeal (where factual findings are subject to a “clearly erroneous” standard of review).

Since the decision-maker could go either way, what would account for a particular decision? In Ms. Reade’s case, the decider’s view of sexual assault in general would be one factor. Do victims make false accusations? Do perpetrators deny their guilt? How much evidence is enough? In this particular case, I imagine partisan loyalty would also be a factor for many decision-makers, especially in such a hot political environment where an allegation of sexual assault could impact the upcoming election. And speaking of partisan loyalty, what about Ms. Reade’s political views? Are they relevant to impugning or bolstering her claim? What about the fact that she is exposing herself to terrible harassment (and maybe worse). How do we weigh these factors in terms of evaluating her motive? Also, how do we account for other women accusing Joe Biden of inappropriate touching? Do these allegations weigh against him (because he engaged in inappropriate conduct) or in his favor (since that conduct seems not to have risen to assault)? In short, it seems to me that the decision about Ms. Reade’s credibility tells us more about the fact-finder’s views than about the facts of her case.

If I am correct about Ms. Reade’s claim, what does this mean for credibility in asylum cases? In some ways, the situations are analogous. We have to listen to a witness and evaluate credibility. It’s also fairly common for asylum applicants to change their stories over time. This may be legitimate (it often takes time and trust to extract painful details from a traumatized person) or not (some applicants seek to bolster their claims by lying). As with Ms. Reade’s case, there is often additional evidence, which also needs to be evaluated for credibility and evidentiary value, and in cases where this evidence is strong, it may be determinative of credibility. In other cases, the credibility determination will depend largely on the decision-maker’s inherent biases. I suspect this is largely what accounts for the arbitrariness of asylum adjudication. 

In Ms. Reade’s case, I doubt we will ever see a definitive answer about her claims. They are too old and too subsumed by partisanship to be resolved with much confidence. Many asylum claims are also not amenable to a definitive conclusion due largely to limited resources (of the applicant and the adjudicator). In both situations, we are left with our own biases, which are a poor substitute for knowing the truth. 

Neuroscience, Memory, and Credibility in Immigration Court

This article is by Aldis Petriceks of Harvard Medical School, Erin Shortell of Harvard Law School, and Dr. Francis X. Shen, JD, PhD. Executive Director, Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior; Instructor in Psychology, Harvard Medical School; Senior Fellow in Law and Applied Neuroscience, Harvard Law School Petrie-Flom Center.

The success of an asylum claim relies, to a large degree, on the perceived credibility of an asylum seeker’s memory. The Real ID Act of 2005 states that “[t]he testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee” (emphasis added). Asylum officers and immigration judges are told, in a sense, to act as mind readers, subjectively deciding whether or not to believe the narratives of asylum seekers.

But how do judges and asylum officers assess credibility? Additional evidence, such as physical signs of abuse or country-level evidence of systematic torture, can bolster credibility in this context. But such evidence may not be available, and even if it is, credibility assessments still turn on asylum adjudicators’ subjective perceptions of asylum seekers’ memories.

Introducing your authors: Aldis Petriceks, Erin Shortell, and Francis X. Shen.

Credibility determinations thus often rest on the consistency (or lack thereof) in an asylum seeker’s story. The REAL ID Act provides that “ … a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on … the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements … , the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record … , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”

Asylum applicants will often recount their stories at multiple points in the legal journey, including immediately upon entry into the U.S.; in a subsequent written affidavit; and before an asylum officer or immigration judge. If inconsistencies or inaccuracies emerge, the asylum adjudicator often infers that the asylum seeker intends to deliberately mislead him or her.

There is, of course, a logic to this inference. If the story changes, one might reasonably infer that the storyteller is purposely crafting a narrative more favorable to a preferred legal outcome.

Intuition is important, but decades of research into the neuroscience of memory suggest that such intuitions need to be carefully examined. Research conclusively shows that memory is not a digital recording of our lives, and thus changes in asylum seekers’ narratives over time may not be due to deliberate deception but rather to the nature of human memory itself.

Autobiographical memories are not accessed as one might re-watch a scene from a movie. Rather, memories are “dynamically reconstructed mental representations,” and they change every time they are retrieved and recounted.

Memory scientists typically talk about three phases of a memory: Encoding (when the sensory systems first register the sights, sounds, smells and more of an event); storage (when that memory gets tucked away in the brain for later use); and retrieval (when the memory is consciously recalled). Context affects each of these stages. Of great relevance to asylum seekers’ credibility is the well-known finding that trauma and stress affect how memories are initially encoded, whether and how they are stored, and how we consciously recall them.

The bottom line for credibility is that inconsistencies in autobiographical recall may not reflect a willful attempt to bend the truth, but rather the biological reality that recalling memories usually involves modification of those memories in ways of which most people are not fully aware.

Do asylum adjudicators take notice of this neuroscience? In theory, they could. The Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (“RAIO”) Manual for Officer Training tells officers that it is “[their] job to determine whether those inconsistencies and/or contradictions are due to a lack of credibility or may be explained by other factors.” One of these “other factors” is the basic neurobiology of trauma and memory. But in practice, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which asylum officers abide by this instruction.

What would it mean for asylum adjudicators to better understand the relationship between memory, narrative inconsistency, credibility, and the human brain? To begin, it would entail the realization that many asylum seekers have endured tremendous trauma, and that this trauma often has documented effects on memory. Asylum seekers who have experienced trauma in their home countries, on the way to the U.S., or upon entry into the U.S., are often burdened by these effects. Brain scan research on individuals with PTSD, for instance, finds decreased activity in the brain networks associated with autobiographical memory, and an associated decrease in specific autobiographical recall. Given the prevalence of PTSD among asylum seekers, it is likely that many otherwise credible refugees will fail to describe their journeys, fears, and traumas in a detailed, coherent manner across multiple interviews. This failure, however, does not necessarily indicate a lack of credibility.

Acute stress often interferes with autobiographical memory. People perform more poorly on memory tests after injections of hydrocortisone, a compound which mimics the effects of cortisol on the body. When faced with significant trauma, children often recount memories in a vaguer, less detailed manner, regardless of the presence or extent of primary psychological conditions.

It remains unknown exactly how trauma and memory are related in the brain. Some researchers believe that trauma leads to an over-general mode of autobiographical memory largely because the exclusion of detail might prevent re-traumatization. Others argue that trauma directly alters the activity of certain neurological networks, changing one’s ability to retrieve and recall specific memories. Regardless of the particular theory embraced, however, there is general agreement that people with histories of trauma have more altered capacities to remember specific details of events in their lives, and that those alterations are at least associated with measurable changes in neurological structure, function, and physiology.

So far, this neuroscientific knowledge has not been widely introduced to asylum officers or immigration judges. When these adjudicators determine that an applicant is not credible, “they overwhelmingly rely on inconsistencies within or among the various versions of the applicant’s story.” Can this gap between scientific understanding of memory and legal practice be bridged? At the MGH Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior, we think the answer is yes—with sustained effort and input from multiple disciplines.

Three areas are ripe for exploration. First, attorneys and judges need an improved understanding of how autobiographical memory works. To be sure, memory neuroscience cannot provide an asylum officer or immigration judge with an individualized “credibility detector.” But neuroscience can provide evidence for re-examining default presumptions that tend to equate inconsistency with deliberate falsehood.

Second, scientific articles standing alone are not sufficient to inform legal doctrine and practice. Actionable neuroscience requires the development of materials that can be readily adapted by lawyers to put forth arguments related to neuroscience, memory, trauma, and credibility.

Third, extended dialogue is required to explore both the promise and pitfalls of introducing neuroscience into asylum case law. For instance, might neuroscience memory research allow government lawyers to challenge otherwise consistent recollections? Just as a criminal defense attorney might call a “false memory” expert to aid his or her client’s defense, could similar arguments be made in the asylum context to undercut genuine claims of persecution? These and other concerns must be adequately addressed as part of an on-going law and neuroscience dialogue.

As with any new endeavor, the path for neuroscience and law in asylum cases is not clear. But there is much promise, and we hope there will be much more dialogue in the future.

About the MGH Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior: The Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior works at the vanguard of applied neuroscience, making neuroscience actionable for the legal community in order to ensure just and positive outcomes for all those affected by the law. Though the brain and the law are both complex, our work is quite simple: helping judges, lawyers, case workers, enforcement agents and many other actors across the legal ecosystem determine the right solutions for the right people and cases. We promote and enable the sound application of accurate neuroscience to critical areas of the legal process: criminal trials and sentencing, juvenile justice, elder protection and immigration enforcement and asylum. For more, see clbb.org.