The BIA on Firm Resettlement

One of my professional goals in life is to get a published decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). It won’t be easy–the Board publishes only about one case out of every 1,000 (I wrote about this problem in a blog post called, The Unbearable Lightness of BIA-ing). If the Board could publish more cases, it would provide better guidance to the nation’s Immigration Judges and would probably result in more consistency across the country. Alas, it seems unlikely that the BIA will take my suggestion anytime soon.

I did have a recent case that I thought might stand a chance of publication. As far as I know, it was an issue of first impression (meaning that there are no other published cases discussing the same topic). It is also a fairly common issue, so some guidance from the Board would have been appropriate. The bad news is that my dreams of publishing glory have been shattered, as the Board issued an unpublished decision in my case. But the good news is, we won. And perhaps our unpublished victory might be helpful to others who are in a similar situation.

Unlike published BIA decisions, unpublished decisions are not binding on Immigration Judges. However, they are “persuasive,” meaning that if you can find an unpublished case on point, you can submit it to the Judge, who will hopefully consider it. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (the office that administers the BIA and the Immigration Courts) does not release unpublished decisions, but fortunately, there is a sort-of underground network led by the legendary Dan Kowalski, where attorneys can submit their unpublished decisions and make them available to others.

My case centered on a legal construct called “firm resettlement.” An alien who has been “firmly resettled” in a third country is ineligible for asylum. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(2)(vi). My client’s husband had been a high-ranking member of his country’s government. When the government turned against him, he and the rest of the family fled to a neighboring country, which granted the family asylum–hence, they were firmly resettled in a third country. As a result of being firmly resettled, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied asylum, but granted Withholding of Removal as to the home country, and ordered my client and her children deported to the third country.

During the pendency of the BIA appeal, the home government assassinated my client’s husband while he was residing in the third country. After the assassination, DHS agreed that the case should be remanded to the IJ.

On remand, we presented evidence that my client could not return to the third country, as she no longer had any status there. We also presented evidence that it was no longer safe for her in the third country.

DHS argued that even if she could not return to the third country, she had been firmly resettled there, and that she was thus barred from asylum. The lawyer described firm resettlement as a door. Once you pass through it, you are forever barred from asylum. When you read the case law (and the primary case on this point is Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011)), the government’s argument is not unreasonable. Though, in fact, while Matter of A-G-G- lays out a framework for the firm resettlement analysis, it does not cover the situation in our case, where the country of firm resettlement somehow becomes unsafe.

Ultimately, the BIA accepted one of several arguments we presented. The Board held:

The intent of the firm resettlement bar is to disqualify asylum applicants who have previously found another country of refuge, not another country in which he or she faces a danger of persecution…. Given respondent’s situation with regard to [the third country], we conclude that, even assuming she otherwise would be viewed as having firmly resettled in that country, she is not barred from asylum.

Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the Board went beyond the analysis of Matter of A-G-G- and looked to the intent of the firm resettlement bar. The intent, the BIA says, was only to bar “aliens who had already found shelter and begun new lives in other countries.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 56 (1971)).

It seems to me that the Board’s emphasis on the intent of the bar is significant. If you only read the firm resettlement bar (INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(2)(vi)) and Matter of A-G-G-, you could reasonably conclude–like the DHS attorney and the IJ in my case–that once a person is firmly resettled, she is forever barred from asylum. But that is not the conclusion the Board has now reached.

I am glad for the result and for my clients, but I am disappointed that the BIA chose not to publish this decision. The issue that my clients faced–where the country of resettlement is unsafe–is not uncommon. A number of my clients have faced similar situations, and I suspect that they are not unique. A published decision would have helped clarify matters and provided better guidance to our country’s Immigration Judges.

Maybe I am asking for too much. Maybe I should just be happy with what we got. Maybe I am being a big jerk for looking this gift horse in the mouth. But I can’t help but think that if the BIA would publish more decisions–especially in cases where there is no existing precedent–our Immigration Court system would be more consistent and more efficient. And so while I am thankful that we received a good decision from the Board in this particular case, I am also thinking about how much more good the Board could do if it made a concerted effort to fulfill its role as “the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws,” and if it would publish more cases.

BIA Expands the Definition of Firm Resettlement

A recent BIA decision addresses the issue of firm resettlement. See Matter D-X- & Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 664 (BIA 2012).  If an alien is firmly resettled in a third country, she is not eligible for political asylum in the United States. 

Last year, in a case called Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486, 488 (BIA 2011), the Board set forth a framework for determining whether an alien is firmly resettled and thus barred from obtaining asylum.  First, DHS bears the burden of presenting prima facie evidence, such as a passport or other travel document, of an offer of firm resettlement.  The asylum applicant can then rebut DHS’s prima facie evidence by showing that the offer has not, in fact, been made, that he would not qualify for it or that an exception to firm resettlement applies.  One exception is that the applicant’s entry into the country “was a necessary consequence of his or her flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish significant ties in that country.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(a).

A frequent diner card from the Belize City Johnny Rockets may constitute prima facia evidence of firm resettlement.

In Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, a Chinese asylum seeker went to Belize where she fraudulently obtained a residence permit.  She then continued her journey to the United States and filed for asylum.  Despite the Belize residency permit, the Immigration Judge found that the alien was not firmly resettled because she remained in Belize “only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel” and she “did not establish significant ties in that country.”  The IJ granted asylum.

The BIA reversed, holding that, “Even if the respondents used some form of fraud or bribery through a middleman to obtain [the residency permit], there has been no showing that they were not issued by the Belize Government.”  The Board also noted, “aliens who have obtained an immigration status by fraud should not be permitted to disavow that status in order to establish eligibility for another type of relief.”  The BIA concluded that the alien’s “claim of fraud in obtaining permits to reside in Belize does not rebut the DHS’s prima facie evidence of firm resettlement in that country [i.e., the fact that she held a Belize residency permit].”

This decision is problematic because it is common for aliens to obtain false documents from countries that will not protect them while they are en route to the United States.  For example, I have represented a number of East African clients who fraudulently obtained South African passports.  These people have no permission to remain in South Africa, and if that government discovered their fraud, they would be deported to the country where they face persecution.   Thus, any “status” they may have in South Africa is tenuous at best.

Perhaps the alien in Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, should have done a better job obtaining evidence to rebut the presumption of firm resettlement in Belize.  For the rest of us, the case is a cautionary tale–if a client has used a fraudulently obtained documents from a third country, she had better obtain evidence demonstrating that she is not firmly resettled in that country.

The BIA on Firm Resettlement

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) an alien who is “firmly resettled” in a third country is ineligible for asylum in the United States. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15.

If Angelina Jolie shows up, it probably means you are not firmly resettled.

It’s been more than 20 years since the BIA issued an opinion on firm resettlement, and during that period, the various federal circuit courts have weighed in, creating a patchwork of inconsistent law across the U.S.  In a new decision, Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA May 12, 2011), the Board has issued important guidance concerning firm resettlement.

The BIA held that the Department of Homeland Security has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing of an offer of firm resettlement by presenting direct evidence of an alien’s ability to stay indefinitely in a third country.  When direct evidence is unavailable, indirect evidence may be used if it has a sufficient level of clarity and force to establish that the alien is able to permanently reside in the country.  An asylum applicant can rebut this evidence by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that such an offer has not been made or that the applicant’s circumstances would render him or her ineligible for such an offer of permanent residence.

The failure to apply for permanent residence where it is available to an alien does not rebut evidence of firm resettlement.  Thus, evidence that permanent resident status is available to the alien under the law of the third country may be sufficient to make a prima facie showing of an offer of firm resettlement, and a determination that the alien is firmly resettled is not contingent on whether the alien applies for permanent status in the third country.

It makes sense that the initial burden of proving firm resettlement is on the DHS–in most cases, an alien subject to the firm resettlement bar will have lived for a time in a third country.  In this case, the alien, A-G-G-, was a Mauritanian national who lived in Senegal for eight years.  He married a Senegalese citizen.  The fact that the alien resided in Senegal alerted DHS to the possibility of a firm resettlement bar, and they submitted evidence that A-G-G- could live permanently in Senegal.  A-G-G- then had an opportunity to rebut that evidence.  The fact that he chose not to apply for permanent status in Senegal was not sufficient–in and of itself–to avoid a permanent resettlement bar.  However, if there was some reason that A-G-G- could not live in Senegal, he could have presented that evidence and perhaps avoided the bar.

Matter of A-G-G- seems to strike a fair balance between protecting an asylum seeker’s ability to obtain asylum and preserving the government’s interest in barring people who have permanent residency elsewhere.